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WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
ticular states to a large extent in diversity cases. The reasons for urging
the constitutionality of the amendment are not germane to an appli-
cation of the laws, but to the finding of facts by jurors in the state
courts where the citizen of the District is forced by these decisions to
litigate, and where trial by jury has been stripped of many of its safe-
guards. Notable among these safeguards is the power of the judge as
at common law to comment upon the evidence and to overcome bias
by the jury by other means of control. It has been suggested that even
greater reason exists for diversity jurisdiction in suits between a citi-
zen of the District and a citizen of a state than in suits between citi-
zens of different states, because of the possibility that jurors may tend,
even unwittingly, to identify the District citizen as a bureaucratic op-
ponent of state's rights.
ENOS ROGERS PLEASANTS, JR.
THE VALIDITY OF ANTI-CLOSED SHOP LEGISLATION
One of the most significant features of labor legislation in the past
five years has been the widespread adoption of various statutes and
constitutional amendments restricting or prohibiting the closed shop
and other union security devices. These laws have ranged from the
elaborate regulations set forth in the Taft-Hartley Act' to simple statu-
tory prohibitions of the closed shop.2 Despite the prevalent contro-
versy concerning the merits of such enactments, there is a marked
scarcity of judicial pronouncements passing directly on the validity of
this legislation.3 For this reason particular importance attaches to the
(D. C. Md. 1947): "Since, under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra, the federal court,
in diversity of citizenship cases, must apply the State law as declared by the highest
State court, it is not seen how the resident of the District of Columbia will suffer
any substantial disadvantage from having to sue in a State court."
161 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 158 (a) (3) (Supp. 1947).
2For an analysis of current legislative restraints upon union security devices,
see Sutherland, Reasons in Retrospect (1947) 33 Corn. L. Q. s, 9-14; Note (1947) 42
Ill. L. Rev. 505, 505-7.
'Florida's constitutional amendment that the "right to work" should not be
abridged because of membership or non-membership in a union was, upheld in
American Federation of Labor v. Watson, 6o F. Supp. soio (S. D. Fla. 1945), but
this decision was reversed in 327 U. S. 582, 66 S. Ct. 761, 90 L. ed. 873 (1946), on
the ground that the Florida amendment had not been authoritatively construed in
the state courts. A subsequent effort to obtain such authoritative construction failed,
because of. combination of six causes of action in a bill for declaratory judgment.
31 S. (2d) 394 (Fla. 1947): An adjudication of the constitutionality of the Tennessee
anti-closed shop statute was avoided and the case was .determined on a procedural
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fact that the Supreme Court of the United States has granted review
to recent state court decisions in which the validity of anti-closed shop
legislation is directly assailed.4
In State v. Whitaker,5 the Supreme Court of North Carolina af-
firmed the conviction of George Whitaker, a building contractor, and
various officials of local building trades unions, for contracting that
Whitaker would employ only union members. The only question was
that of the constitutionality of the anti-closed shop statute which was
violated.6 The Supreme Court of Arizona, in American Federation of.
Labor v. American Sash & Door Co.,7 sustained the dismissal of an ac-
tion for a declaratory judgment of the constitutionality of the "right
to work" amendment to the state constitution.8 These two cases will un-
doubtedly be decided upon virtually identical grounds by the Supreme
Court of the United States, and upon their adjudication will hinge the
validity of the more extreme restrictions of union security devices, cur-
rently so popular in the western and southern states.9 Although the
point in Federal Firefighters of Oak Ridge v. Roane-Anderson Co., 206 S. W. (2d)
369 (Tenn. 1947). However, this statute was later upheld in Mascari v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, reported as 209 S. W. (2d) 756 (Tenn. 1948) in the ad-
vance sheets, but withdrawn by order of the Court for unspecified reasons. 2o9 S.
W. (2d) Xn.
No. 626, American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., and No.
66o, Whitaker v. State of North Carolina, 16 U. S. L. Week 3291 (March 3o, 1948).
A third decision, Lincoln Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 149 Neb.
507, 31 N. W. (2d) 477 (1948), sustaining Nebraska's constitutional amendment pro-
hibiting the closed shop, was more recently granted review. No. 761, 16 U. S. L.
Week 3347 (May 25, 1948). The state court's opinion in this case followed closely
the reasoning of the Whitaker and American Sash &. Door decisions, and added very
little new material to the general question.
5228 N. C. 352, 45 S. E. (2d) 86o (1947).
6N. C. Sess. Laws (1947) c. 328: § i: "It is hereby declared to be the public
policy of North Carolina that the right of persons to work shall not be denied or
abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor union." § 2:
Any agreement between employers and unions to make union membership a con-
dition of employment "is declared to be against public policy and an illegal com-
bination in restraint of trade." [A combination in restraint of trade is punishable
as a misdemeanor. N. C. Gen. Stat. (Michie, 1943) Sec. 75-1] §§ 3, 4 and 5 pro-
hibit the employer to require employees to join or abstain from joining labor unions
or to pay dues or fees to labor unions, as a condition of employment. Other sec-
tions allow a worker to recover damages from an employer who denies him em-
ployment in violation of the statute.
767 Ariz. 20, 189 P. (2d) 912 (1948).
sAriz. Const. Amend. (1946): "No person shall be denied the opportunity to
obtain or retain employment because of non-membership in a labor organization,
nor shall.., any corporation, individual, or association of any kind enter into any
agreement ... which excludes any person from employment or continuation of em-
ployment because of non-membership in a labor organization."
OSee Millis and Katz, A Decade of State Labor Legislation (1948) 15 U. of Chi.
L. Rev. 282, 283-4.
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Taft-Hartley Act expressly permits the several states to enact such
measures,10 the Supreme Court's determination of the constitutional
status of these state regulations may conceivably decide the validity of
the milder restrictions of the federal act itself.
It seems essential that the Court make some pronouncement as to
the influence exerted upon the current anti-closed shop laws by the
famous and controversial decisions of Adair v. United States" and
Coppage v. Kansas,12 in which federal and state statutes prohibiting
-an employer from discrimination against union members in hiring
and discharging were held to be an unconstitutional interference with
freedom of contract. In neither of the recent cases now under dis-
cussion was the problem of the lingering precedents of the Adair and
Coppage cases given more than a passing mention. Judge Sewell of
the North Carolina court, observed that "State laws... which out-
law 'yellow dog contracts' were first ruled unconstitutional, but are
now regarded as valid,"' 3 while Judge Udall of the Arizona court re-
ferred briefly to "outdated and overruled cases holding anti-yellow-
dog contract legislation invalid."'
4
Ti'he rationale of the principal cases may be briefly stated thus:
adopting the criterion of due process propounded in Nebbia v. New
York,15 and apparently acknowledging the self-restraint exercised by
the Supreme Court in regard to state economic regulation since that
time, the state courts recognize that here the police power of the state
is paramount to the old sanctity afforded freedom of contract; the
precedents of Adair v. United States and Coppage v. Kansas, support-
ing the concept of a greater freedom of contract, are regarded by these
courts as finally overruled by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Board;16 and consequently, if a legislature may now pro-
161 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 164 (b) (Supp. 1947).
"2o8 U. S. 16l, 28 S. Ct. 277, 52 L. ed. 436 (19o8).
'2236 U. S. 1, 35 S. Ct. 240, 59 L. ed. 441 (1915).
"3State v. Whitaker, 228 N. C. 352, 45 S. E. (2d) 860, 873 (1947).
"American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 67 Ariz. 20, 189
P. (2d) 912, 919 (1948).
"291 U. S. 502, 525, 54 S. Ct. 505, 510-11, 78 L. ed. 940, 950 (1934): "And the
guaranty of due process... demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable,
arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and sub-
stantial relation to the object sought to be attained." See American TFederation of
Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 67 Arix. 20, 189 P. (2d) 912, 917 (1948); State
v. Whitaker, 228 N. C. 352, 45 S. E. (2d) 86o, 866 (1947).
1313 U. S. 177, 61 S. Ct. 845, 85 L. ed. 1271 (1941). The Court held that refusal
to hire certain workers solely because of union membership was an unfair labor
practice under the Wagner Act. 49 Stat. 452-3 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 158 (3) (1942)-
See note 43, infra.
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hibit discrimination because of membership in a union, it may also
prohibit discrimination because of non-membership in a union.17 The
crucial factor in this entire argument is the interpretation to be given
to Justice Frankfurter's words in the Phelps Dodge case, decided in
1941: "The course of decisions in this Court since Adair v. United
States... and Coppage v. Kansas... have completely sapped these
cases of their authority."'s The question which now evolves is whether
the present status of the Adair and Coppage doctrine is such that the
courts of Arizona and North Carolina are justified in so easily dis-
posing of these decisions.
Adair v. United States19 held that a provision of the Erdman Act,
2 0
making unlawful the discharge by an interstate carrier of an employee
solely because of membership in a labor organization, was invalid
under the Fifth Amentment. The Court, speaking through Justice
Harlan in ago8, declared: "... any legislation that disturbs the equal-
ity [of employer and employee] is an arbitrary interference with the
liberty of contract which no government can legally justify in a free
land."2' The view was well substantiated by earlier state court deci-
sions,2 2 although Justice Holmes, dissenting, pointed out that there
was "a very limited interference" with freedom of contract in prohibit-
ing certain discriminations by "the more powerful party."
23
The principle of the Adair case was accepted as decisive in the seven
17This proposition that "sauce for the management goose" should necessarily
be "sauce for the labor gander" could, in itself, be subjected to some criticism. It is
apparently supported by no stronger authority than a dictum of Justice Rutledge:.
"Of course espousal of the cause of labor is entitled to no higher constitutional
protection than the espousal of any other lawful cause." Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.
S. 516, 538, 65 S. Ct. 315, 326, 89 L. ed. 430 (1945), quoted in State v. Whitaker,
45 S. E. (2d) 860, 873 (N. C. 1947).
18313 U. S. 177, 187, 61 S. Ct. 845, 849, 85 L. ed. 1271, 1279 (1941) [italics sup-
plied].
u2b8 U. S. 161, 28 S. Ct. 277, 52 L. ed. 436 (19o8).
2D3o Stat. 424 (1898).
2208 U. S. 161, '75, 28 S. Ct. 277, 280, 52 L. ed. 436, 442-3 (igo8).
2Gillespie v. People, 188 Ill. 176, 58 N. E. 1007 .(900); Coffeyville Vitrified
Brick & Tile Co. v. Perry, 69 Kan. 297, 76 Pac. 848 (1904); State v. Julow, 129 Mo.
163, 31 S. W. 781 (1895); State ex rel. Zilmer v. Kreutzberg, 14 Wis. 530, 9o N. W.
1098 (1902). See United States v. Scott, 148 Fed. 431, 436-7 (W. D. Ky. 19o6). .
People v. Marcus, 185 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. 1076 (1906) reached the same re-
sult, but is worthy of'special mention for its holding that the employer's right to
require an employee to. abstain from union membership was 4 part of that same
freedom of contract enabled the employer to place his employment wholly within
union control, citing Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N. Y. 207, 76 N. E. 5 (19o5), in which a
closed shop contract with a trade union was upheld.
2Adair v. United States, 2o8 U. S. 161, 191, 28 S. Ct. 277, 287, 52 L. ed. 436, 449
(1908).
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years which intervened 24 before the Supreme Court complemented
that doctrine with the decision of Coppage v. Kansas.25 Here a state
statute rendering unlawful the requiring of an agreement to refrain
from union membership as a condition of employment, was held un-
constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Holmes again dis-
sented, on the ground that, if a worker might reasonably believe that
only by union membership could he secure a free contract, this belief
"may be enforced by law in order to establish the equality of position
between the parties in which liberty of contract begins." 26
The doctrine of virtually absolute freedom of contract in the em-
ployment relationship, as a direct barrier to removal of anti-union
discrimination, continued to be of undiminished influence in the
federal and state courts for over a score of years after the adjudication
of -Adair v. United States.27 The theory of the Adair and Coppage
cases was not directly limited, even after 1930,28 but was restricted only
2Goldfield Consol. Mines Co. v. Goldfield Miners' Union, 159 Fed. 5oo (C. C. D.
Nev. 19o8); State ex rel. Smith v. Daniels, 118 Minn. 155, 136 N. W. 584 (1912).
"... the employer may contract with his employe to buy his labor upon terms
other than the union ones, and, in order that the union ones may not be disturbing
elements in the conduct of his business, may bind his employe not to become a
member of the union...." Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 172 Fed. 963,
967 (C. C. N. D. W. Va. 1909).
2 2 3 6 U. S. 1, 35 S. Ct. 24o, 59 L. ed. 441 (1915).
26236 U. S. 1, 27, 35 S. Ct. 240, 248, 59 L. ed. 441, 451 (1915). Justices Day and
Hughes, dissenting, sought to distinguish this from the Adair case, in that the
state statute was directed against an employer's coercing the employee, as a condi-
tion of hiring, to forego his legal right to organize. 236 U. S. i, 38, 35 S. Ct. 240, 253,
59 L. ed. 451, 455 (1915).
nMontgomery v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 293 Fed. 68o (C. C. A. 9 th, 1923);
Cyrus Currier & Sons v. International Moulders' Union, 93 N. J. Eq. 61, 115 At.
66 (1921); Bemis v. State, 12 Okla. Grim. 114, 152 Pac. 456 (1915); Nashville Ry. &
Light Co. v. Lawson, 144 Tenn. 78, 229 S. W. 741 (1921); McNatt v. Lawther, 223
S. W. 503 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920). See Owen v. Westwood Lumber Co., 22 F. (2d)
992 (D. C. Ore. 1927); Grassi Contracting Co. v. Bennett, 174 App. Div. 244, 249,
16o N. Y. Supp. 279 (1916); Michaels v. Hillman, 112 Misc. 395, 396-7, 183 N. Y.
Supp. 195 (192o).
The only discordant note in the litigation of this period is found in Jackson v.
Berger, 92 Ohio St. 130, 11o N. E. 732, 735 (1915), where the dissent anticipated the
criticism of later years in referring to freedom of cbntract as a "severely over-
worked" concept, and suggested that holding such a statute unconstitutional was
a denial of equal protection to the worker in depriving him of his right of organiza-
tion.
2In re Opinion of the Justices, 271 Mass. 598, 171 N. E. 234 (1930); In re
Opinion of the Justices, 275 Mass. 580, 176 N. E. 649 (1931); In re Opinion of the
Justices, 86 N. H. 597, 166 Atl. 640 (1933). But see Howes Brothers Co. v. Massa-
chusetts Unemployment Compensation Comm., 296 Mass. 275, 5 N. E. (2d) 720,
729 (1936).
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indirectly by the interpretation of federal statutes designed to safe-
guard or stimulate the process of collective bargaining.
2 9
This process of restriction was initiated in Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v.
Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks,30 which marked the be-
ginning of the trend away from the absolute rules of the Adair and
Coppage cases. The Court upheld an injunction restraining the rail-
road from interference with its employees in their selection of col-
lective bargaining representatives, as provided in the Railway Labor
Act of 1926.31 Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for a unanimous Court,
sought to distinguish the Adair and Coppage cases on the ground that
the Railway Labor Act did not interfere with the carrier's right to
select or discharge its employees. "The statute is not aimed at this
right of the employers but at the interference with the right of em-
ployees to have representatives of their own choosing."
32
Subsequently, when a labor federation sued to compel its recogni-
tion by a carrier as the representative of certain employees, 33 the Rail-
way Clerks case was cited for the proposition that there was no inter-
ference with the normal right of selection or discharge of employees.
The Court proceeded to state that the provisions of the amended
Railway Labor Act34 "neither compel the employer to enter into any
agreement, nor preclude it fom entering into any contract with indi-
vidual employees."
35
"Governmental disapproval of contracts which impair the right of the em-
ployee to unionize may also be found in federal and state statutes which restrict
the use of the injunction in labor disputes. Section 3 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 103 (1942), declared the "yellow dog" contract
unenforceable in the federal courts and eliminated it as a basis for injunctive re-
lief. This served to overthrow the extension of the Adair and Coppage decisions,
made in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 38 S. Ct. 65, 62 L. ed.
260 (1917), in which the union was enjoined from interfering with a "yellow dog"
relationship. See Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930) 146-9;
Fraenkel, Recent Statutes Affecting Labor Injunctions and Yellow Dog Contracts
(1936) 30 Ill. L. Rev. 854, 857.
However, anti-injunction statutes were recognized as fundamentally different
from the statutes stricken down in the Adair and Coppage cases. "To attempt to
impute criminality to an act that is sanctioned by the Constitution is obviously
different from prescribing a special procedure to be followed to obtain injunctive
relief in a special class of cases." Starr v. Laundry & Dry Cleaning Workers' Union,
155 Ore. 634, 63 P. (2d) 1104, 1105 (1936).
-281 U. S. 548, 50 S. Ct. 427, 74 L. ed. 1034 (1930).
g44 Stat. 577 (1926).
'2281 U. S. 548, 571, 50 S. Ct. 427, 434, 74 L. ed. 1034, 1O46 (1930).
1 Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S- 515, 57 S. Ct. 592, 81
L. ed. 789 (1937).
448 Stat. 1185 (1934), 45 U. S. C. A. §§ 151-163 (1942).
3-300 U. S. 515, 559, 57 S. Ct. 592, 6o5, 81 L. ed. 789, 8o6 (1937). The import of
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When the constitutionality of the original National Labori Rela-
tions Act 3a was affirmed in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp.,3 7 the doctrine of Adair and Coppage was once
again held "inapplicable" 38 to legislation in furtherance of collective
bargaining. "The Act does not interfere with the normal exercise of
the right of the employer to select its employees or to discharge them.
The employer may not, under cover of that right, intimidate or coerce
its employees with respect to their self-organization and representa-
tion....-39 The authority of the National Labor Relations Board
to order reinstatement of employees discharged for union activity40
was sustained as a permissible sanction for the protection of the em-
ployees' right to organize. 4'
Anti-union discrimination in hiring, the familiar counterpart of
anti-union discrimination in ,discharging, was conclusively determined
to be an unfair labor practice 42 by the decision of Phelps Dodge Corp.
v. National Labor Relations Board.43 The extension of the Wagner
the passage quoted was subsequently abrogated by the ruling that agreevients with
individual members of the bargaining unit must be subordinated to coll'ctive bar-
gaining agreements. J. I. Case Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U. S.
332, 338-9, 64 S. Ct. 576, 58o-81, 88 L. ed. 762, 768 (1944).
"49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 151-166 (1942).
3o U. S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. ed. 893 (1937).
n"This brief reference [in the Railway Clerks case, note 32, supra] to the case
of Adair v. United States and Coppage v. United States [sic], makes it entirely clear
that the court had no intention to depart from the principles involved in those
cases, instead they are recognized but held inapplicable." National Labor Relations
Board v. Mackey Radio & Tel Co., 87 F. (2d) 611, 6ig (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
301 U. S. 1, 45-6, 57 S. Ct. 615, 628, 81 L. ed. 893, 916 (1937).
4049 Stat. 454 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 16o (c) (1942).
"Prior to this decision, the application of the National Labor Relations Act so
as to limit the right to bargain had been questioned as a denial of due process, by
the authority of the Adair and Coppage cases. Pratt v. Stout, 85 F. (2d) 172 (C. C. A.
8th, 1936). Even after the Jones & Laughlin opinion, the relaxation of the old pre-
cedents in order to protect the employees in their self-organization was not uni-
versally recognized. Kitty Kelly Shoe Corp. v. United Retail Employees, 126 N. J.
Eq. 374, 9 A. (2d) 295 (1939). See National Labor Relations Board v. Tidewater
Express Lines, go F. (2d) 3o (C. C. A. 4th, 1937).
"49 Stat. 452-3 (1935) 29 U. S. C. A. § 158 (3) (1942).
"313 U. S. 177, 61 S. Ct. 845, 85 L. ed. 1271 (1941). In regard to the constitu-
tionality of the prevention of discrimination in hiring, the Court placed reliance
upon the concurring opinion of Judge Learned Hand in Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 113 F. (2d) 202, 207 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940). "Nor am
I moved by the argument that the employer must be free to hire whom he will.
The whole purpose is to limit his liberty so far as its exercise may invade the new
rights created; and I pan see no greater limitation in denying him the power to dis-
criminate in hiring, then in discharging." See also the opinion of Judge Magruder
in National Labor Relations Board v. Waumbec Mills, 114 F. (2d) 226 (C. C. A. 1st,
1940), quoted in note 55, infra.
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Act to allow the Board to direct the hiring of workmen where no em-
ployment relationship had existed before was indeed a far cry from
any concept of unrestrained freedom of contract. When Justice Frank-
furter, as spokesman for the Court, pronounced Adair v. United States
and Coppage v. Kansas "completely sapped of their authority,"44 it
seemed to indicate that the two old cases had become nothing more
than dead letters.
The proponents of the closed shop, who now seek to use the reason-
ing employed in the Adair and Coppage decisions in their assault
upon anti-dosed shop laws must solve three closely related problems.
First, they must show that the labor movement can rely upon the
theory of freedom in the employment contract, without repudiating
the series of decisions which have greatly limited that theory for the
benefit of the unions. Second, they must prove that that theory, as
propounded in the decisions of former years, was not completely dis-
carded in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board.
Third, they must demonstrate that the surviving precedents of Adair
v. United States and Coppage v. Kansas present an insuperable ob-
stacle to prohibitions of the closed shop.
At first glance, it appears an extreme paradox for the advocates of
union labor to place reliance upon the decisions of forty years ago
in an endeavor to brand current legislation an invalid impairment
of freedom of-contract. It may well be argued that this prima facie
inconsistency explains the scant consideration which was accorded the
Adair and Coppage problem by the Arizona and North Carolina
courts.49 This question merits a detailed reply, for a satisfactory an-
swer to the issues involved will be of great aid in answering the other
queries set forth above.
The old statutory prohibitions of anti-union employment prac-
tices were stricken down by the courts in adherence to a concept of
freedom of contract as an attribute of our basic liberty. Only the
most unquestioned exercises of the police power would permit gov-
ernmental intervention in the employer-employee relationship to pass
the barriers of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. However, the
growing intensity of economic crises in the past two decades has caused
a multitude of legislative efforts to combat alleged evils in our in-
dustrial system. It is common knowledge that the constitutional ques-1
"313 U. S. 177, 187, 61 S. Ct. 845, 849, 85 L. ed. 1271, 1279 (1941).
"sAmerican Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 67 Ariz, 2o, 189 P.
(2d) 912, 919 (1948); State v. Whitaker, 228 N. C. 352, 45 S. E. (2d) 86o, 873 (1947).
See notes 13 and 14, supra.
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tions thus raised were resolved in the courts by a general recession
from the judicial precepts of the past. The former inflexible attitude
toward freedom of contract was relaxed, though often with reluctance,
by the judges who gradually recognized the perils of uncontrolled
economic forces. In this recanting of the dogma of previous years, no
one component in our society gained more than organized labor. The
sustaining of the Wagner Act46 and its subsequent enforcement rep-
resent an advance which would have seemed impossible earlier in this
century. The course of opinions has been marked by the imposition
of sweeping limitations upon the doctrine of Adair v. United States
and Coppage v. Kansas. Employers have been prohibited from inter-
fering with the selection of bargaining representatives 47 and compelled
to recognize labor organizations as representatives, 48 while discrimi-
nations in hiring49 or discharging5O have been declared unfair labor
practices.
A rationale of the theory of free contract which will leave unim-
paired these limitations must be discovered, if this theory is to be used
in an attack upon anti-closed shop legislation. Otherwise the adoption
of the liberty of contract doctrine by the labor movement will imperil
the victories won in imposing restrictions upon that doctrine.
The answer to the problem is to be found in the devolution of the
free contract precedents which have been discussed here. The majority
of the Court, in the Adair and Coppage opinions, fortified its position
with a discussion of liberty of contract51 which is of considerable per-
suasive power to those who are willing to overlook the same determina-
tive factor which the majority of the Justices disregarded: that the or-
"National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 3ol U. S. i,
57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. ed. 893 (1937).
17Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S. Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 50
S. Ct. 427, 74 L. ed.1o34 (1930). See note 3o, supra.
"8Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515, 57 S. Ct. 592, 81
L. ed. 789 (1937)- See note 3, supra.
"National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 3o1 U. S. i,
57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. ed. 893 (1937). See note 37, supra.
5OPhelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U. S. 177, 61 S.
Ct. 845, 85 L. ed. 1271 (1941). See note 43, supra.
5E. g.: "The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems
proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of labor to pre-
scribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor. from the person offer-
ing to sell it. So the right of the employe to quit. the service of the employer, for
whatever reason is the same as the right of the employer, for whatever reason, to
dispense with the services of such employe." Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161,
174-5, 28 S. Ct. 277, 280, 52 L. ed. 436, 442 (19o8), quoted in Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U. S. 1, 10-1', 35 S. Ct. 240, 242, 59 L. ed. 441, 444-5 (1915).
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dinary worker's liberty to contract did not generally exist in fact.52
Justice Holmes, dissenting in Coppage v. Kansas,53 recognized that
true freedom in the employment contract was an illusion so long as
there remained so pronounced a disparity in the bargaining position
of the parties. The gradual comprehension of this thesis by the su-
preme tribunal was coupled with the acceptance of the correlative
proposition that only through self-organization of the employees could
some equality of bargaining position be obtained.
54
The Court professed to regard the employer's liberty of contract as
basically unimpaired by the statutory protection of unionization. Free-
dom to hire or discharge was limited only insofar as it interfered with
the right of the employees to associate tin labor organizations. 55 In
other words, the employer was restricted only when he exercised his
rights so as to impair the rights of the employee. Liberty of contract
is not a privilege to be denied the laboring class, but only through
organization can this liberty be achieved. Thus it is by no means in-
consistent to place reliance upon the theory of free contract and si-
multaneously to extol the decisions which protect the right to or-
ganize, for with the laborer the latter is an indispensable prerequisite
to the former.
If the Phelps Dodge decision is'viewed as an isolated phenomenon,
it may seem that the reference therein made to Adair v. United States
and Coppage v. Kansas implies that these cases were overruled in fact,
if not in name. However, if the 1941 decision is regarded in its proper
position at the conclusion of a series of opinions, a different interpre-
0Cf. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Texas & N. 0. R. Co., 24 F. (2d) 426, 429
(S. D. Tex. 1928): "... in Adair v. U. S...., a majority of the Supreme Court of
the United States had not been able to see that the custom of bglancing the con-
centrated power of the employer, on the one hand, by the concentrated power of
the employee, on the other, in negotiating wage and working agreements .... had
so established itself as to become justiciable."
0 2 3 6 U. S. I, 27, 35 S. Ct. 240, 248, 59 L. ed. 441, 451 (1915). See note 26, supra.
"4National Labor Relations Board v. Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach
Co., 85 F. (2d) 990, 994 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936): "... . it is noteworthy that the argument
of the Court [in the Railway Clerks case] was based, as were the dissents in Adair
v. United States, upon the power of Congress ... to safeguard the recognized right
of the employees to organize and bargain collectively...."
OJefferson Electric Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 1O2 F. (2d) 949, 957
(C. C. A. 7 th, 1939): "At the common law, the right of the employer to discharge was
unconditional and absolute .... Under the National Labor Relations Act, the right
to hire and discharge remains inviolate, when exercised for ordinary ends." National
Labor Relations Board v. Waumbec Mills, 114 F. (2d) 226, 236 (C. C. A. Ist, 1940):
"This normal right of selection or discharge may still be exercised for any reason
deemed sufficient by the employer, except for the restriction that it may not be
exercised for the purpose of interfering with the self-organization of employees."
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tation evolves. It has been indicated in some detail how the original
doctrine of liberty of contract, as expounded in the early decisions,
was restricted to protect the self-organization of the workers. The
Phelps Dodge holding that anti-union discrimination in hiring was
an unfair labor practice was the culmination of the restrictive pro-
cess to which the free contract concept was submitted. In the Railway
Clerks, Virginian Railway and Jones & Laughlin decisions, cited by
Justice Frankfurter as sapping the authority of the Adair and Coppage
cases, the Court carefully indicated that Adair and Coppage were mere-
ly "inapplicable." Viewing the Phelps Dodge opinion as the projection
of the more recent line of decisions, it does not seem plausible that
the Supreme Court intended to overrule completely its earlier pro-
nouncements. Frankfurter's description of the old cases as "sapped...
of their authority" may be more rationally explained: merely that the
doctrine of inviolability of the employer's freedom to contract has
been eroded so far as necessary to safeguard self-organizatioh of the
employees.
Not only is there a lingering vitality in the precedents of Adair and
Coppage, on which the labor movement may rely without imperilling
the effect of the decisions since 193o, but the precedents, in their pres-
ent limited form, are in fundamental conflict with a legislative ban of
union security devices. It seems beyond doubt that, under an unre-
stricted doctrine of freedom of contract, an employer and a labor or-
ganization would be entirely free to agree that only union men would
be employed, and that a flat prohibition of the closed shop would un-
warrantedly interfere with this freedom. The theory of freedom of
contract still applies to the employment relationship, subject only to
the limitation that the employer shall not use the power of his su-
perior bargaining position to restrain the employees' right to organize.
This limitation, placed solely to protect the right to self-organization,
cannot conceivably be extended to condone anti-closed shop legisla-
tion. Neither the theory of Adair and Coppage nor the subsequent re-
strictions placed thereon will permit the present enactments to endure.
If anti-closed shop laws are to be sustained, then Adair v. United
States and Coppage v. Kansas must be unequivocally overruled.
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